Overcoming a Premarital Agreement: Opinions, June 7, 2018

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals released a memorandum opinion in In re Veldekens, No. 14-16-00770-CV, primarily regarding a premarital agreement and the evidence necessary to overcome its separate property provisions.

The day before the parties married in 2007, they executed a premarital agreement which precluded the accumulation of community property during the marriage. Seven years later, wife filed for divorce. After a bench trial, the marital residence was confirmed as wife’s separate property. The husband appealed.

In his first issue, husband argued the trial court erred in ruling the marital property was wife’s separate property because he presented evidence that wife sold a one-half interest in the property to him, including a sales contract and a hand-written note acknowledging husband’s one-half interest. However, it appears from the opinion that either the husband did not provide or admit into evidence a copy of the purported sales contract or the sales contract itself failed to convey a one-half interest in the property to wife. Wife evidently testified that she did not intend to sell a one-half interest in the property to husband and the trial court could have determined her testimony was credible. And the trial court reasonably could have determined that the $50,000 paid by husband to wife was a gift. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s finding that the property was wife’s separate property and overruled the husband’s first issue.

This also led the COA to overrule the husband’s second issue. Under the terms of the premarital agreement, the parties were barred from making a claim for any property designated as separate property and making such a claim could entitle the other party to attorney’s fees for defending the claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s finding of attorney’s fees for wife in defending against husband’s claim for the marital property.

Finally, in his third issue, the husband alleged the trial court abused its discretion in not awarding him a full SPO. He made the novel argument that “[i]t is well past the time for Texas courts to discard the undefined legal vernacular of ‘best interest’ in resolving conservatorship issues and set forth viable guidelines for determining when a trial court can strip a parent of its alienable right to statutorily mandated periods of possession with his or her children.” The COA cited the Holley factors and then recited the trial court’s findings of fact that the husband uses abusive language around the children, calls the mother inappropriate and extremely vulgar names in the presence of the children, he becomes more frustrated and abusive toward the mother the longer his visitation period lasts, he is stressed by getting the children ready for school in the morning, the children are often stressed when the father participates in the morning routine, husband tended to exercise his possession at his parents’ house which was forty miles from the school, and for these reasons the children should not have overnights on Sunday or Thursday nights. The COA affirmed.




Contempt & Inability to Comply: Opinions, May 22, 2018

Three new memorandum opinions to discuss this morning! The First District Court of Appeals released its opinion in In re White, No. 01-18-00073-CV on contempt and the Fourteenth Court of Appeals released two memorandum opinions which primarily concern the division of the marital estate: Slagle v. Slagle, No. 14-16-00113-CV, and a barnstorming 32-page opinion in In re Mugford, No. 14-16-00436-CV.

In In re White, father filed an enforcement alleging four violations of a previously entered modification order against mother. That modification order incorporated an MSA signed by the parties. The trial court found two violations: 1) the mother canceled a counseling session; and 2) the mother violated the MSA requiring her to transport the child to and from each counseling session because the MSA required her to take the child to counseling at least once a month but she had taken the child to only four sessions in the six months following the agreement. Mother was held in contempt and placed on community supervision.

Mother filed a habeas corpus proceeding arguing the contempt order must be set aside because: 1) the underlying order was not specific enough to support contempt; 2) she did not violate the underlying order; and 3) the evidence showed an inability to comply with the requirements that the trial court imposed.

Regarding the mother’s cancellation of the counseling session, the Court of Appeals sustained the mother’s objection to this contempt finding because the provision in the underlying order required her to “follow the counselor’s recommendations regarding the frequency of the sessions.” Because mother’s actions in canceling a counseling session did not violate the terms of the order, the contempt finding was set aside.

The order did require her to bring the child for reunification counseling “a minimum of once a month.” The Court of Appeals found the evidence supported the trial court’s finding of a violation because the evidence showed that mother admitted that between March 2017 and December 2017 she took the child to a total of four sessions. Mother’s challenge to the violation finding was overruled.

But Mother also argued that she established a defense by proving an involuntary inability to comply with the underlying order. Specifically, she argued her son is a six-foot-tall, 17-year-old football player and she is unable to force him to attend counseling if he refuses. Both the mother and her son testified that the son refused to attend the canceled session, despite mother’s admonitions that he do so. The son further testified that after telling his mother he would not go to the session, he took the car and left the house. The Court of Appeals held that the mother and the son were interested witnesses and that the trial court was free to disbelieve their testimony and thus determine mother had the ability to comply and that the mother had not conclusively established her involuntary inability to comply. (While the holding of the Court of Appeals makes sense, one must wonder if mother could have established this defense and if so, how.)

In summary, the first violation was set aside, but the second was affirmed.

In Slagle v. Slagle, the husband challenged the division of the marital estate. Specifically, he argued: 1) the trial court erred in finding a business was his separate property and that the community estate was entitled to reimbursement for community funds used to benefit the SP business; and 2) the trial court violated his due process rights in several ways. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.

Husband and wife married in 2000. Wife filed for divorce in 2014. At the time the divorce was filed, wife was employed full time, but husband (who had an MBA in accounting and finance) was not. He admitted that he was devoting more than sixty hours a week to “spending money” on a lawsuit involving his separate business. Husband also spent all of his free time day-trading, which he evidently was not successful at, losing $130,000 in 2013 alone.

Husband’s separate property business, Graphic Creations, existed at the time of the marriage, with two locations in amusement parks operated by Six Flags. During the marriage, Graphic Creations grew to six locations. Under its agreement with Six Flags, Graphic Creations paid 30% of its earnings to Six Flags. Wife testified that the business was profitable and husband had used it to pay his way through college. But the business hit hard times when Six Flags did in 2007. Six Flags increased the fee to Graphic Creations to 40% of earnings. Graphic Creations sued Six Flags over the increase. Wife testified that husband did not earn an income after 2007. Husband maintained an office for Graphic Creations until he shut down the business in 2013.

Wife testified that husband spent all of his time on the Six Flags lawsuit, leaving the house at 6 am and sometimes not returning until 2 am and that during this time he began taking Adderall. Husband returned the salary he paid himself from Graphic Creations which totaled $164,502. Wife testified that loans to Graphic Creations from her salary totaled $681,042.

The trial court found the community estate was entitled to a reimbursement from husband’s separate estate for $681,042 and that wife was entitled to a judgment of $340,521.00. To “pay” this judgment, wife was awarded the house, the entire 401(k), and the entire IRA, which still left a debt of $65,391. To offset this debt, husband was awarded the AMEX and Chase Visa credit card debts (which totaled only $42,000).

Husband challenged the division because, according to him, it awarded 100% of the community’s assets to wife and 100% of the community’s debts to him. The Court of Appeals overruled the issue because the evidence admitted supported the judgment.

In his second issue, the trial court violated his due process rights by 1) allowing wife to file amended pleadings days before the final trial; 2) wife failed to serve her trial exhibits and her inventory on him prior to trial; and 3) the trial court failed to adhere to various local procedural rules and the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. But he failed to preserve error during trial and the issue was overruled. The trial court was affirmed.

Finally, in Mugford v. Mugford, wife challenged various portions of the divorce judgment including property and custody issues. Mother and father are Canadian citizens who moved to Friendswood for husband’s work. The parties separated in 2015 and a jury trial was held in December 2015. The jury named the parties as JMCs with mother as primary. The jury also found that grounds for divorce existed on the basis of cruel treatment by both parties and adultery by father. The jury also determined the characterization of eight items of property, six of which are challenged on appeal. Remaining issues, such as terms of possession and access and division of the marital estate, were decided by the trial court. A final decree was entered on March 16, 2016 and mother timely appealed.

In her first issue, mother claimed the trial court erred by employing a smaller geographic restriction in its judgment than the jury provided. That is, the judgment allowed her to designate the child’s primary residence within 30 miles of the city limits of Calgary, Alberta, Canada, but the jury’s answer allowed a radius of 50 miles. The Court of Appeals found that mother was misinterpreting the jury’s answer which gave a geographic area as “Calgary, Canada & 50 mi outward radius–or–Galveston County & contiguous counties.” Thus, the jury did not give her a 50 mile radius from the city limits of Calgary,  but 50 miles from the center of Calgary. Because the record did not reflect how far the city limits of Calgary are from its center, it also did not show that the geographic restriction in the judgment was smaller than that awarded by the jury. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court did not enter the jury’s verdict in its decree and that the trial court was not permitted to “clarify” the jury’s answer. The issue was sustained and, in its conclusion, the COA modified the decree to reflect a fifty-mile outward radius of Calgary as the geographic restriction.

In her second issue, mother argued the trial court erred by granting father a SPO incorporating the “alternate beginning and ending possession time” found in section 153.317 of the TFC.  The decree stated that the minor variations in the possession order from the SPO were in the best interest of the child under TFC §153.253. (Only in her reply brief did mother assert the evidence in support of the variation was legally and factually insufficient, which the COA said was too late.) Because section 153.253 allows variation from the SPO and the evidence in the record of father’s work schedule, the child’s school schedule, and father’s frequent travel to Canada supported a variation, the issue was overruled.

Issues three through fifteen concerned the division of the marital estate. First, issues three through six concerned the admission of expert testimony. Mother’s third issue is that the trial court erred by allowing father’s expert to testify about the terms of the lines of credit used to purchase the Friendswood house because the expert had never read those notes and/or contracts and they were not produced prior to trial pursuant to requests for discovery. The fourth issue was overruled because it was inadequately briefed. In issue five, mother argued the trial court erred in admitting the same expert’s testimony and report (except for the reimbursement claims) because he erroneously characterized the bank debt as father’s separate liability and the resulting loan proceeds as father’s separate property. In issue six, mother argued the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the expert’s testimony because his misstatements of law rendered his opinions concerning the character of the marital property incorrect and unreliable. Mother had filed a Daubert motion before trial, a hearing was held, and the motion was overruled. Mother does not challenge the expert’s qualifications or the relevance of his testimony, but whether his testimony was based on a reliable foundation.  The trial court’s job is not to determine whether the expert’s conclusions are correct, but whether the analysis used by the expert is reliable. The bulk of mother’s complaint is that the expert mischaracterized the debt from three lines of credit as father’s separate property and the distributions from a funding entity as father’s separate property. As it was not the trial court’s job to determine the accuracy of the expert’s conclusion, issues three, five, and six were overruled.

In issues seven through nine, mother argued the trial court erred by admitting a loan document, Petitioner’s Exhibit 130. Mother objected to the admission of PE 130 on the grounds it had not been produced in response to her third supplemental request for production. She also claimed unfair surprise, denial of due process, failure to authenticate, and hearsay. Father acknowledged the document was not produced in discovery, but stated the requests for production were limited in time to the start of the marriage and the document was dated well before then. While mother’s brief included a footnote reciting the RFP (and father did not dispute that the recitation was correct) mother did not refer the Court of Appeals to the location of the requests in the record and the requests themselves fail to indicate whether or not they are limited to a specific time period. The COA held that mother’s “failure to cite to the relevant portion of the trial court record prevents this court from resolving this claim on its merits and therefore waives appellate review.” Issue seven was overruled (ouch).

Mother also argued the exhibit was not properly authenticated but father’s uncontroverted testimony was that the document was scanned and emailed to him from the Royal Bank of Canada and thus the record contained evidence that the document was what father claimed it was and thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling mother’s authentication objection. Issue eight was overruled.

Mother also objected to the document on hearsay grounds and the COA agreed that the the trial court erred in admitting the document over mother’s hearsay objection. But then the inquiry turned to whether the error probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. Mother did not explain how the admission of PE 130 probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. Issue nine was overruled.

In her tenth issue, mother complained she was not allowed to bring in her own expert after PE 130 was admitted. The COA found this point was inadequately briefed and thus overruled.

Issues eleven through thirteen related to the characterization of marital property and fourteen concerned mother’s reimbursement claims. The Court of Appeals went into great detail on the amounts and percentages of various accounts found to be father’s separate property, overruling issue eleven as to four out of five accounts. For one  account (“Account 1418”), the COA found that no witness testified about the account and that the exhibits did not corroborate father’s claim that the account was entirely his separate account and mother’s issue was sustained as to that account.

Regarding the real property in Friendswood, the jury found 78% of the house was father’s separate property and 22% was community property. The COA held that a reasonable fact finder could find there was clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the community property presumption. Issue twelve was overruled.

In her thirteenth issue, mother argued the trial court erred in sustaining father’s objection to mother’s attempted explanation of Texas law on partition or exchange of community property during opening argument. The COA found the trial court did not err in sustaining the objection because P&E agreements were not relevant in this case.

Mother’s fourteenth issue argued the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the jury’s answer to the question concerning the community estate’s claim for reimbursement from father’s separate estate. The jury awarded $12,020 as reimbursement owed by father to the community estate. Mother asserted she was entitled to additional reimbursement, but the COA found she failed to establish as much and the issue was overruled.

Finally, in her fifteenth issue, mother claimed the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the community estate because the division was “grossly” disproportionate and awarded “the majority” of the community estate to father. First, mother’s argument that the community was entitled to $24,821 of Account 1418 was not evidence of an unfair and unjust division. But beyond that, to determine whether the assets of the community were divided in a just and right manner, the COA requires the court’s findings on the value of those assets and without those findings, the COA cannot know the basis for division, the values assigned to the community, or the percentage of the marital estate each party received. Neither the judgment nor the findings of fact or conclusions of law reflected the value the court assigned to each asset or liability or the value of the community property. The parties’ respective inventories do not substitute for the court’s findings and the issue was overruled.

In conclusion, the decree was modified to reflect the jury’s response concerning the geographic restriction, but the record did not reflect the trial court abused its discretion in the overall division, nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering minor variations from the SPO. As modified, the decree was affirmed.










Arbitrating an MSA Drafting Dispute: Opinions, May 17, 2018

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals released a memorandum opinion in Farmer v. Farmer, No. 14-17-00077-CV yesterday, which primarily concerns the effect of an arbitrator’s ruling on a MSA drafting dispute.

Wife filed for divorce in March 2015 and husband counterpetitioned. After a number of continuances, the trial court denied wife’s last motion for continuance and set trial for good on September 19, 2016.

On the date of trial, the court excluded wife’s expert, Robert Adams. After that, the parties entered into an MSA which was proved up that same day. The trial court orally rendered the divorce on September 19 and, on October 26, 2016, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce. (If I’m reading this opinion correctly, the timeline here is impressive: On the date of trial, the parties held a Daubert hearing on wife’s expert; then they rushed to mediation, settled the case, and signed the MSA. Then they rushed back to the courthouse and proved up the MSA before the ink was dry. Quite a day.)  Wife filed a motion for new trial, complaining the trial court improperly incorporated a property division into the decree. The property division included in the decree evidently was the ruling of the mediator, serving as arbitrator of drafting disputes. The MNT was denied by operation of law.

On appeal, wife asserted three issues: 1) the decree should be set aside because it departs from the MSA on the property division; 2) wife’s expert was improperly excluded; and 3) wife’s motion for continuance was denied.

On the first issue, wife argued the property division from the MSA should have been used in the decree, not the one signed by the mediator/arbitrator. First, the Court of Appeals noted that the divorce decree and the property division were attached to her notice of appeal and to her opening brief in an appendix, but were not in the appellate record. Because the documents were not included in the record, the Court of Appeals could not consider them.

But even if they had been in the appellate record, the Court of Appeals held the trial court did not err. First, the trial court could have reasonably relied on the property division as being the result of arbitration (as was provided for in the MSA). Secondly, wife did not include a sufficient record of the arbitration. The first issue was overruled.

As for her second and third issues, husband argued these issues were moot because the parties settled. The Court of Appeals agreed, finding the issues became moot once the parties signed the MSA. The trial court was affirmed.

Offers of Proof for Excluded Evidence: Opinions, May 10, 2018

The First District Court of Appeals released a memorandum opinion this morning in Jacob v. Jacob, No. 01-16-00835-CV, denying mother’s appeal of an order denying her request for an increase in child support. The mother and father had a child and divorced in 2010. Subsequently, the mother had another child and consequently sought a reduction in her monthly child support. At trial, she sought to introduce evidence of her increased expenses and costs related to the new baby, but father objected to the evidence as going outside the scope of her disclosures. Crucially, mother did not make an offer of proof and the Court of Appeals overruled the issue because the error was not preserved. Additionally, mother filed a motion for new trial regarding the excluded evidence, which was denied by the trial court, and the  Court of Appeals affirmed because a motion for new trial cannot preserve error related to the admission or exclusion of evidence. Finally, mother challenged the trial court’s failure to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law, but the Court of Appeals said the remedy for that was to move in the appellate court to abate the case and order the trial court to issue the FF/CL. The trial court was affirmed.

Default Judgment, Disabilities, & Child Support: Opinions, May 3, 2018

The First District Court of Appeals released a memorandum opinion this morning in Dobyanski v. Breshears, No. 01-17-00407-CV, in which the Court of Appeals sustained Father’s restricted appeal and reversed an increase in child support granted on a default basis. Though the case is about child support, it also concerns disability findings and the evidence necessary to establish them.

Mother and Father entered into an agreed order which required Father to pay $490/mo in child support until the child reached the age of 18. About five years later, Mother petitioned for a modification and increase in monthly support.

Father was not present at the modification hearing. Mother testified (and provided doctor’s reports) to the child’s diagnoses of vaccination delay, oppositional defiance disorder, ADHD, developmental language disorder, and autism spectrum disorder. She also testified that the child’s schedule and routine could not vary from day to day and that she believed the child’s disability would prevent her from working full time.

Regarding the father’s financial status, she testified that he was employed as a conductor for a railroad. She also presented a copy of an agreed order from another case in which Father was ordered to pay child support of $600/mo. That agreed order from 2015 showed Father’s gross monthly resources were $7,437.56 and his net monthly income $5,423.30.

Mother requested an increase to $1,200 in monthly child support. She conceded that under the guidelines, Father would not owe $1,200/mo unless his gross monthly income was $9,200. Mother testified that she believed Father was capable of earning that much because he was always telling her he could not visit the child because he was working.

The trial court entered a default order which found: 1) there had been a substantial and material change in circumstances; and 2) the child required substantial care and personal supervision and would not be capable of self-support as long as his disability existed. The order increased the child support obligation to $1,200/mo and to continue beyond the child’s age of 18.

Father filed a restricted appeal, alleging Mother failed to adduce evidence of the parties’ net resources that justified the amount of child support or that the support should continue beyond the child’s 18th birthday.

The Court of Appeals found that the evidence did not support the finding that the child was disabled because Mother’s testimony that the child, aged 6, requires a “very high level of care ” and constant monitoring “does not explain how [the child] requires care beyond that required for a typical child of his age or the extent to which any care or supervision is made necessary by his diagnoses.” Further, the list of diagnoses “provides no information concerning the severity of those conditions or how they may limit his ability to function,” nor did the evidence show the extent to which the mother “takes more time or incurs additional expense to care for and supervise [the child].”

Finally, the evidence before the trial court did not show the father’s current net resources or the additional financial support that is necessary to provide the child with substantial care and personal supervision indefinitely into the future.

The Court of Appeals specifically cited and relied upon Justice Guzman’s concurrence in the denial of petition for review in In re D.C., No. 16-0543, in which Justice Guzman essentially said–rightly– that the caselaw regarding adult disabled child support and the evidentiary requirements thereof under TFC §154.302 was all over the map because of the ambiguity of the statute and calling on the Legislature to provide the courts with more guidance (which I blogged about here). Today’s opinion appears to be a signal to the trial courts that at least the First District Court of Appeals is going to be a lot more rigorous in its review of evidence in support of disability findings under Section 154.302 in the future.




Evidence, Predicates, & Rule 408: Opinions, May 1, 2018

This morning, the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals released a memorandum opinion in In re J.C.K., No. 14-17-00082-CV, an appeal from a modification in which the father was ordered to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of $252,996.55. But most of the father’s issues on appeal and much of the twelve-page opinion revolve around evidentiary rulings and a packet of documents–a MacGuffin–that was never entered into evidence.*

In April, 2010, the trial court entered a divorce decree which named the parents JMCs of the child. In December, 2010, mother’s attorney sent a letter to father’s attorney which included a proposed modification order, a packet of other documents, and an affidavit by the mother which alleged the father had assaulted her as well as several other women and had drug and alcohol problems. At the time, the father was on deferred adjudication for a previous assault of the mother that had occurred prior to the divorce. In the letter, the mother’s attorney expressed a desire that the parties could reach an agreement regarding the modification based on the attached documents or the mother would have to file the mod with the affidavit attached. According to the father, the proposed modification order would have effectively ended his right to see his son as the proposed order made visitation at the mother’s sole discretion and would have required him to pay exorbitant sums in child support. As mentioned above, the packet of documents which accompanied the letter from mother’s lawyer was also at issue at trial and the appeal. In his brief, father calls this letter from mother’s lawyer an extortion attempt.

Mother filed the modification (without the affidavit attached), seeking to be named SMC, limiting the father’s possession and access, and requesting an increase in child support and payment of the mother’s attorney’s fees. The father counterpetitioned. At the conclusion of the trial, the court named mother SMC and ordered father’s visitation be reduced, supervised, and contingent on him meeting certain requirements, such as him attending drug therapy, and avoiding conviction for domestic violence. The court also ordered him to pay $252,996.55 in attorney’s fees. The court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law found mother had presented credible evidence of father’s drug abuse and violence against women and that it was in the child’s best interests to modify the order.

During the trial, father offered the attorney’s letter which preceded the suit and the mother’s affidavit into evidence. They were admitted. He also evidently “indicated a desire” to enter into the record the entire packet of documents that accompanied the letter and affidavit, but evidently did not offer them. Then, after trial, he attempted to enter into the record a formal bill of exception containing the document packet, but the trial court sustained mother’s objection and refused to accept or sign the bill. Specifically, the trial court found father failed to lay the proper predicate or mark and offer the packet into evidence. Also, he failed to timely comply with all requirements to obtain a completed formal bill of exception.

The father’s first seven issues on appeal assert the trial court erred by not admitting into evidence or considering the packet of documents. Father submitted a bench brief in which he argued the packet of documents was admissible. Mother argued the documents constituted part of a settlement offer and thus were inadmissible. The trial court found that, at that point during the trial, the documents were part of a settlement offer, but did state that the court had not yet heard testimony which would support admitting the documents into evidence under one of the other purposes Rule 408 allows for settlement-related material. On appeal, father argued this was a final ruling regarding the admissibility of the documents; mother argued the trial court did no more than offer a preliminary indication of its ruling which could  change subject to later testimony and potential predicate-laying.  The Court of Appeals found father failed to actually offer the packet of documents into evidence, failed to lay a predicate, and thus failed to preserve the issue of the admissibility of the packet. The issues were overruled.

In his eighth issue, the father challenged the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the award of attorney’s fees. The trial court found mother had incurred $414,809.80 in reasonable attorney’s fees and ordered father to pay $252,996.55 to mother’s attorney. The Court of Appeals found that though the evidence supporting the reasonableness of the fees “[was] quite succinct,” it was sufficient to support the award.

The trial court was affirmed.

*Because the packet of documents was not entered into evidence and was not part of the record, the court’s opinion does not indicate what the packet contains.







Homeschooling & Educational Decisions: April 26, 2018

The Fourteenth District Court of Appeals released a memorandum opinion this morning in In re M.C.K., No. 14-17-00289-CV, concerning homeschooling and educational decisions.

Mother filed a modification regarding custody of the child. Though Father did not file any pleadings regarding educational decisions, the MSA explicitly stated that the parties were reserving educational decisions as an issue for trial. Mother objected at trial to educational decisions being an issue at trial and the trial court allowed Father’s oral trial amendment.

When the child was a baby, Mother was awarded the right to make educational decisions for the child. But once the child became school-aged, Father sought to share that right because he was concerned about Mother’s homeschooling of the child. The trial court modified the parent-child relationship to give both parents the right to make educational decisions and ordered that, if they cannot agree, the child will attend public school. Mother appealed, arguing the evidence was insufficient to support the judgment.

At trial to the bench, Mother testified that she opposes public schools because: they do not promote critical thinking; they primarily teach children to memorize and regurgitate facts for standardized tests; and they do not teach Hebrew in school which was important to her because she is Jewish. She does not have any teaching degrees or certifications, though she did teach for one year at a Montessori school and she homeschooled her two older children (ages 16 and 11) for their whole lives. She testified that she does not follow a specific curriculum but she shops for textbooks on eBay, at teacher supply stores, and at HalfPrice Books. While the children are working on assignments she gives them, she works as a subcontractor for an online company that offers work-from-home employment.

Father testified that he is worried that the child is isolated in her homeschooling environment and that the child had never attended a birthday party or had play dates with other children. Mother testified that the child played with other children in the community, but she could not name any friend of the child’s and admitted the child had never been to a birthday party for a five-year-old. Father also expressed concern about the child’s curriculum and testified that when he asks the child what she is learning, the child does not say anything.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, finding the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s judgment and that the trial court’s judgment was not an abuse of discretion.


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